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Abstract
We use a dataset of 1062 individuals from the Czech Republic to forecast the evolution of tax
evasion in that country. We ask each respondent how intensely (never, sometimes, often) he
evaded taxes in 1995, 1999, and 2000, to calculate probabilities the average individual will
move between these categories of evasion in any given year. These "trasition" probabilities
allow us to predict a rising tide of tax evasion in the next decade. We estimate the reduced
form parameters which determine evasion and suggest how government might influence these
parameters to prevent the Czech Republic from bogging down in a permanent mire of tax
evasion. (JEL Codes : H26, H43, K42, O17)
I.  Motivation
The study of tax evasion by economists is a young field. Most efforts at research have focused
either on measuring the size of the sector that evades taxes, or in explaining why people evade
taxes. Few have sought to model how tax evasion evolves. The man who today does not2
evade taxes may next year decide to deduct from taxable income the car he uses to take his
children to school. Emboldened by his first dodge he may in later years graduate to the corps
of hardened evaders who do not declare their incomes and so do not need to fuss with receipts
for false deductions. Another hardened evader may decide it is time to quit his stealthy ways
and return to the society of taxpaying citizens. Each year government revenues will vary as
millions of individuals slip in and out from the shadows of evasion. If we could know how
likely an individual is to slip between tax-paying and tax-evading status we could draw a line
to the future that traces the size of the community of tax evaders. To find the likelihood of tax
evasion we surveyed Czechs in 2000. We asked them to put themselves in one of three
categories: In the course of each year I evade taxes never, sometimes, and frequently. We
asked them this question for 1995, 1999, and 2000. By asking the question for different years
we were able to form an idea of how people drift between different categories of tax evasion.
Our estimates of the drift allows us to surmise how people might move between categories
over the next five years. Our results suggest that unless the probabilities of moving between
categories change, a growing number of Czechs will become hardened tax evaders. To
discover how governments might slow the slide to tax evasion we estimate an equation that
seeks to explain why an individual would evade taxes. The individual’s age, income, sex, and
whether he lives in a town or a village all bear on his decision to evade, as does government￿s
efforts to stem evasion. We show that as the population ages, tax evasion will rise.
Government could counter tax evasion either by lowering taxes or by increasing the
perception that it is delivering public goods of increasing quality for the crowns taxpayers
hand  from their wallets.
The plan of the present paper is first to discuss the dataset on which we base our analysis, and
then to use this data to forecast how tax evasion will evolve if government does nothing to3
change the parameters that influence an individual’s choice to evade. Finally, we estimate the
parameters of the individual’s choice to evade and use these to perform simulations that show
how government might stem the rising tide of evasion our data predict.
II.  Data on the Czech Republic
Our data come from a survey of 1062 Czechs carried out in 2000. Table 1 shows some
summary statistics of the demographic features of respondents. Our survey is similar to that of
Fortin et al. (2000). The technique they used was to conduct interviews (in our case face-to-
face interviews) to gather information about how much tax people evade and why they evade.
The Fortin et al. survey differed from ours in that it did not ask questions that would allow a
researcher to infer the dynamics of tax evasion. Fortin et al. were interested in the link
between buying goods and services on which taxes were not declared.  We present a detailed
analysis of our dataset elsewhere (Hanousek, Palda 2002), but the main features of tax
evasion to note are that it is primarily a function of life-cycle (rising until late middle-age,
then falling), is primarily a male activity, and is highly associated with part-time work and
unemployment.
The main questions of interest to the present paper were those that asked people how often
they evaded taxes during the year. We gave them the option of answering never, sometimes,
often. Table 2 shows the frequency with which people answered they evaded taxes in 1995,
1999, and 2000.  We calculated 95% confidence intervals for each category of evasion, (the
details of which may be had in the technical appendix).  Table 2, which is better interpreted
by looking at its graphic illustration in Figure 1 just below it, shows a significant upward
trend in the number of those who say they evaded sometimes, an upward but insignificant
trend in those who say they evaded often, and a significant downward trend in those who say4
they never evade. ￿Trend￿ may be too ambitious a term to describe the movements of
individuals between evasion categories. Our data are over too short a period to allow us to
distinguish between what might be evolution over time or business cycle effects. The
empirical literature on evasion summarized in Andreoni et al. (1998) is unanimous that
evasion increase with income and the years between 1997 and 2000 were years of rising
income for the Czechs. Our data must remain silent on this point.
How these trends will play out over time can be best understood by breaking down the
proportion of individuals in each category of evasion in Table 2, into transition probabilities.
Before considering these transition probabilities, we need to briefly review some of the
questions on which research into the evolution of tax evasion has focused.
III.  How Tax Evasion Evolves
The work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Watson (1985), Jung et al. (1994), Yaniv (1994),
others holds that tax evasion is seen as a risky decision. Agents weigh the risk of detection
against the gains from evasion. These models are mainly concerned with optimal audit and
detection policy as in the literature on the economics of  crime and do not model tax evasion
over extended periods. Engle and Hines (1999) have built on these previous models to
simulate and test a model of long-term evasion dynamics in the US. Those outside the US
Internal Revenue Service do not know the basis upon which that service decides to audit
taxpayers, but surmise that a taxpayer￿s probability of being audited is an increasing function
of his current evasion. Engle and Hines (1999) build this surmise in their model in which a
taxpayer￿s current evasion is a decreasing function of prior evasion, ￿since if audited and
caught for evading this year, the taxpayer may incur penalties for past evasions.￿ Aggregate5
evasion shows cycles if a sufficiently large number of individual taxpayers cycle together, as
happens under the influence of aggregate shocks which tend to influence all in the same
direction. In the absence of such shocks Engle and Hines find the interesting result that the
cross-section of evasion rates converges to a steady state and aggregate tax evasion
approaches a limit even though individual rates cycle. The distinction between aggregate and
individual cycles arises because an individual￿s steady state is conditional on not being
audited, while the economy￿s steady state is conditional on a distribution of individual audits
across taxpayers with differing evasion histories.  The distinction between aggregate and
individual cycles in tax evasion is similar to the distinction between family and societal sex
ratios.
We can use Engle and Hines (1999) insight that tax evasion converges to a steady state to
draw conclusions about the evolution of tax evasion in the Czech Republic.  Engle and Hines
used their model to examine continuous aggregate data on tax evasion. Our data is on
individuals and is discrete. We ask the individual whether he evades taxes often, occasionally,
or never.
To see how tax evasion will evolve in the Czech Republic we focus on the probability of
changing between states of evasion. To understand this concept consider Figure 2 which
shows the flow of people in and out of tax evasion status. A proportion of the new labour
force arriving on the market will not evade and another proportion will jump to evading
occasionally and often. Those who are not new to the labour force and do not evade can make
similar jumps. Those who evade often may jump to evading occasionally or not at all and
those who evade occasionally may jump to evading frequently or not at all. These flows in




Often Po,o Po,s Po,n





Never Pn,o Pn,s Pn,n
Each cell gives for an individual the probability he will go from one state in 1999 to another
state in 2000. For example, Po,n gives the probability an individual who evaded often in 1999
will never evade in 2000.
Let us formalize this approach using standard probability notation and identities:
(1) Pj (t) = P.,j = Po,j + Ps,j + Pn,j ,   j=o, s, n
and
(2) Pi (t+1) = Pi, . = Pi,o + Pi,s + Pi,n ,   i=o, s, n.
For any given matrix Π ij , the conditional probability that an individual will be in state i in the
period t+1, given he was in state j in the period t is defined as
(3) P(i| j) ≡  P[i(t+1)| j(t)] = Pi,j /Pj (t)= Pi,j /P.,j,   i,j =o, s, n.
Using the fact that states o,s,n are disjunct partition of the whole probability space, we get
(4) Pi (t+1) = Σ j=o,s,n Pj (t).P(i| j),   i=o, s, n.7
Equation 4 is an important guide to carrying out simulations of tax evasion over the long
term. The notation of equation (4) emphasizes that each individual will have a different
transition probability from other individuals. To precisely estimate how total evasion will
evolve in society we would need to calculate a stage-transition matrix for each individual and
then see what "percentage" of that individual (singular) moves from cell to cell. We would
then add all these percentages in each year to arrive at the total number of evaders in each of
the three categories. A simpler, though slightly less precise way of arriving at the same
calculation is to simply calculate the aggregate transition probabilities. This is easily done by
calculating the percentage of people who moved from cell to cell between 1999 and 2000.
The aggregate probabilities are slightly less accurate than if we used a transition matrix for
each individual, but given the large numbers we surveyed, the central limit theorem suggests
that the variance of our calculations around the true mean (provided that individual transition
probabilities are uncorrelated with each other) will not be far off their true values.
We can set the above framework into action by considering Table 3 which shows the
probability than an individual who was in any of three possible states of evasion in 1999 will
either remain in that state or move to another state. To read this table, consider the second
large cell of the first row. This cell indicates that there were five people in our sample who in
1999 evaded often and then moved to evading occasionally in 2000. These "travelers" from
often to occasionally made up 12.8% of those who evaded often in 1999 and made up 0.5% of
the total sample of respondents in our survey.
In Table 4 we reproduce Table 3 as Table 4(a) and add a new table, Table 4(b). Table 4(b) is
the transition matrix derived from the confidence intervals implicit in Table 4(a).  To create
this table we chose as our transition probabilities the values at the end of our confidence8
bounds. For individuals switching to higher levels of evasion we took as transition probability
the lower bound of the confidence interval, and for those switching to lower levels of tax
evasion we took the upper bound of the confidence interval. We call this the ￿optimistic
scenario￿ because it can be used to simulate the least dramatic growth of the underground
economy predicted from our data. Tables 5(a) and 5(b) use Tables 4(a) and 4(b) to project the
percentage those who will participate in the underground economy over the next five years.
Both tables show a sustained growth of the underground sector. Within the underground
sector the category of  those who evade sometimes grows in both pessimistic and optimistic
cases. In the pessimistic case those who evade often grows by roughly a third, and falls by
roughly a third in the optimistic case. In calculations not shown here we found that under the
optimistic scenario our model would converge to a ￿bad￿ steady state after several decades, in
which all would find themselves evading taxes. Such convergence is similar to Engle and
Hines￿ (1999) discovery of a steady state in evasion. Our work goes a step further than theirs
in that we use transition probabilities estimated from individual data to make our projections.
So far we have presented projections of tax evasion using the probability of moving between
states of evasion between 1999 and 2000. Our data also allow us to calculate long-term
transition probabilities that show the tendencies to shift between categories of evasion over
the period 1995-2000.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of evasion over the next five years using the transition matrix
between 1999 and 2000 as well as the using the long-term transition probabilities between
1995 and 2000. Long-term transition probabilities make projections that go in the same
direction but are less radical than those using the short-term stage-transition matrix between
1999 and 2000. That the results using the long-term stage-transition matrix are less9
pronounced than those using the short-term matrix may be due to chance. A long-term matrix
includes five years of shifting in and out of particular states and may hide the fact that for four
of the last five years an individual was a frequent evader but only shifted to occasional
evasion in his last year. The projections in Figure 3 show only the expected tendency for the
three classes of evasion. Figure 3 does not show the variance of these tendencies. Errors may
cumulate or cancel each other over the long term. Nevertheless, short and long term transition
matrices bound what will be actual tendencies, and as Figure 3 indicates, the Czech Republic
will suffer from a growing number of occasional and frequent tax evaders.
IV.  How to Moderate Tax Evasion
What can the Czech governments do to push back the growing tide of tax evasion predicted
by our survey? One strategy is to change the parameters that influence tax evasion. To
influence these parameters governments need a feel for what influences evasion. To get such a
feel we have estimated a reduced-form logit for each of the nine possible transition
probabilities. We have focused on a reduced form because prediction is our goal. Those who
wish to predict need not concern themselves with the structural parameters that figure in the
steps preceding equilibrium outcomes.  Once we estimate the parameters associated with
variables that drive tax evasion we can ask how one, or a combination of these variables
would have to change to reverse the upward trend of evasion.
Estimating nine transition probabilities calls for a data set far larger than that assembled in our
survey. The demands on the data can be eased if we impose restrictions on the stage transition
matrix. Here is where equation (4) comes in handy. Not all probabilities in equation (4) may
be relevant for predicting participation in the shadow economy several periods ahead. It is
unlikely that an individual will jump from evading no taxes to being a frequent evader, or that10
he will go from frequent evasion to no evasion. Our data confirm the hypothesis that jumps
across two states of evasion are unlikely (our data show no instances of such jumps). Our data
indicate also that once a person is evading, the chance of moving from evading often to
evading sometimes is similar to the chance of moving from evading sometimes to evading
often. It seems there is no ratchet effect between these two categories and that over time we
should observe a random walk in both types (often, and sometimes) of underground
participation. Finally, our data suggest a symmetry in intensity changes for those already
participating. That is, Ps,o = Po,s.
We can summarize the above paragraph in the three following working hypotheses which
allow us to restrict the number of transition probability equations we need to estimate :
•   Symetricity in intensity change for those who are already participating, i.e. H0 : Ps,o = Po,s
•   Bad equilibria (Shadow economy trap) : H0 : Ps,n = 0, Pn,s > 0.
•   No long jumps : Po,n = Pn,o =0.




Often Po,o Ps,o 0
Sometimes Ps,o Ps,s 0
T
Never 0 Pn,s Pn,n
Using the fact that the sum of probabilities equals 1, the above table indicates that we have
only 4 unknown transition probabilities to estimate.11
We have attached to Figure 2 the relevant transition probabilities from the above modified
stage-transition matrix. Readers will wonder how new entrants to the labour force figure in
our calculations. Our data give us no way of knowing who is a new entrant.  If we assume that
entry and exit from the labour force bear a stable relation to each other and that entry and exit
from the labour force is uniformly distributed over evasion categories, we need not consider
explicitly the rates of entry and exit from the labour force in our calculations of how tax
evasion will evolve. Some indirect evidence in support of this surmise comes from our
survey, which shows that those who evade often and those who evade occasionally have
statistically indistinguishable average incomes.
Figure 2 suggests that policy makers concerned about stunting the evolution tax evasion
should guide their attention to lowering the probability of going from never being an evader
to sometimes evading Pn,s . This probability is the one way door through which an honest
citizen passes on his way to novice and then mature tax evader status. Before the policy maker
can influence the transition probability Pn,s  he needs an estimate of the parameters attached to
the independent variables which influence the dependent variable Pn,s.  If there is a change in
the variables with which the parameters interact we can expect the probability of transition
from not-evading to evading sometimes to change. A government worried about tax evasion
will want to study these parameters so that it may know what to expect in the future and so
that it may also change that future.
The dependent variable Pn,s is discrete. Discrete data, as McFadden and Domenich (1975)
emphasize, call for us to model the individual’s choice in a probabilistic framework. The
decision to evade taxes and to move between categories of evasion depends on one’s12
propensity to evade. This propensity depends in turn on the characteristics of the individual Z
(a vector), the penalties for evasion Pe, his perceived risk of apprehension R,  and some
unobserved characteristics of the individual U.  Deaton and Muellbauer (1984) show that if
the unobserved characteristics enter linearly in the utility function, then provided the
difference between the unobserved component of the utility of evasion and the utility of
paying taxes lies above a certain threshold, the individual will begin to evade, or if already
evading, will change evasion categories. Because the U’s are unobserved the researcher must
infer from their distributions the probability an individual will evade. The individual’s choice
is not probabilistic, but rather the researcher’s ability to know the characteristics of each
individual is sketchy, so that he can only talk of his model’s ability to attach a probability to
an individual’s decision to evade.   Pn,s(Z,Pe,R,U)  is a function of the above-mentioned
parameters of the individual’s choice.
Table 4 shows a logit regression of Pn,s  on independent variables. There are many possible
candidates for variables that might influence the transition probabilities. We must choose only
the most likely candidates for inclusion in our equations because maximum likelihood is a
technique whose appetite for data rises exponentially as we add parameters to be estimated.
The explanatory variables we have chosen are fully spelled out in Table 6. The exercise for a
government concerned about the entry of previous non-evaders to the world of tax evasion is
to estimate the parameters of the equation Pn,s =Pn,s(Z,Pe,R,U) and then to imagine how a
change in the independent variables would affect the stage transition probability Pn,s .
We discovered four variables of individual significance in our logits.
1)  If an individual believes his family￿s economic situation has degraded from the year
before he is 6.8% more likely to move from never evading to sometimes evading.  This13
finding is interesting because it suggests that a government which identifies individuals
whose economic situation degraded may perhaps raise, or at least not lose revenue in the
long-run if it cuts taxes for the afflicted groups.
2)  Women are 3.4% less likely to evade than are men. Data from the ministry of labour of
the Czech Republic show a growing trend in the female composition of the labour force.
The rising trend in female participation will moderate the rise in tax evasion our
simulations predicted.
3)  Someone who buys goods or services from the underground sector is 7.7% more likely to
shift from not evading to sometimes evading than someone who does not buy from the
underground sector. As Fortin et al. (2000) showed for Quebec, those who consume
underground learn the benefits of working underground and some of those who learn the
benefits may shift their labour outside the reach of taxation. If the Czech Republic moves
into the European Union, the Union may help the Czech Republic prevent the sale of
underground goods. Our estimated parameters suggest such restrictions will discourage a
significant number of Czechs from learning to become tax evaders.
4)  Believing the penalty for evasion is high will discourage evasion. For each extra one
percent the individual believes he will have to pay as a fine on undeclared income, he
becomes 0.1% less likely to move from never evading to sometimes evading. As we
explained in a related paper (Hanousek, Palda 2002) individuals in the Czech Republic
made grossly exaggerated estimates of the probability of being caught evading.
Government should not be put off by taxpayer ignorance. Taxpayers need not estimate the
level of the probability of being caught correctly to feel the fear of capture. All a
government need do if it wishes to reduce evasion is to stoke this fear of apprehension.14
V.  Challenges and Conclusions
The present paper has presented a model of tax evasion dynamics. We assumed that
individuals jump to and from higher and lower levels of tax evasion. We collected survey data
that allowed us to estimate the stage-transition probabilities that represent the probabilities of
such jumps. Using our estimated probabilities we found that even under the most optimistic
scenarios, tax evasion will grow in the Czech Republic. Our data allowed us in a limited
fashion to see what variables tip an individual to begin evading taxes occasionally. We found
that a rising participation of females in the Czech workforce will temper future evasion, and
that the state may also reduce tax evasion by cutting taxes to those who have recently found
their wealth decline. If the state were somehow able to discourage consumption of
underground goods, it would in the long-term also discourage production. Those who
consume learn how to become evaders. If they do not consume, their knowledge of
underground networks does not grow and so they are less tempted to become evaders than if
they consumed underground.
How seriously should policymakers take these results? The first critique a policy maker
would unleash on our model is that we have not really provided a model of tax evasion. We
have simply assumed transition probabilities without concerning ourselves with the question
of what influences these probabilities. Put differently, we assumed the stage transition
probabilities are fixed. Feedback from the economic environment could change these
probabilities. Our simulations do not allow for such feedback. Our dataset gives a way of
seeing whether our assumption of fixed probabilities is a far step from the path of reality. We
asked questions which allowed us to calculate both short (1 year) and long-term (5-year)
transition probabilities. There was a small statistically significant difference between the two.
We simulated the future using both probabilities. Figure 3 showed that no matter what15
probabilities we chose, tax evasion would increase. The difference between the simulations
seemed small. The relative stability of stage-transition probabilities over the last five years
does not guarantee a future stability of such parameters, nor would a government anxious to
curb evasion wish to believe in such stability. We estimated a logit regression of the
probability of moving between non-evader status and the status of occasional evader. We
found that a rising female work-force may significantly change average transition
probabilities over the coming years. Government may also be able to influence these
probabilities by easing the tax burdens of those whose economic situations have deteriorated.
Our estimation of the parameters underlying the transition probabilities is a partial answer to
the critique that we have assumed transition probabilities fixed. We admit the need for further
explicit modeling of evasion dynamics, but given the sketchiness of existing models, we
believe the present work gives policy-makers a short-to-medium term tool for predicting the
path of aggregate evasion and for understanding how to influence that path.
Our use of survey data to pronounce on tax evasion may also provoke criticism. Survey data
are subject to selection bias. Only those who evade the least will answer surveys on evasion
and their answers will understate how much they evade. We take this as a favourable critique.
Our results underestimate trends in tax evasion and so we err in favour of  Type I error.
Appendix:
Calculating the precision of our estimates: The sample relative frequencies po, ps, and pn allow
us to construct confidence intervals for underlying probabilities Po,Ps, and Pn  and for a whole
transition matrix Π ij  .  Since we analyze a random sample from the Czech  population,
population size, N, will refer to several millions, and therefore, we can use the well-known
normal approximation (see for example Cochran, 1963) to show that16
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where u denotes quantile of the standard normal distribution.
Using this formula, we can see that (retrospectively measured) intensity of participation in
underground economy has changed between 1995 and 2000 (we reject hypothesis, that 1995-
2000 rates are same.
The above are confidence intervals for any particular instant of the Markov process. What
about the confidence interval surrounding a projection T years into the future?17
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Total 1062 524 267 93 73 54
Sex
Male 530 270 178 55 52 41
Female 532 254 89 38 22 13
Age 
18 to 24 years 183 91 60 29 14 10
25 to 39 years 338 185 93 25 28 22
40 to 59 years 440 216 106 37 29 21
Older than 60  101 33 8 2 3 1
Status
Married 635 317 147 43 45 32
Single  w. partner 61 31 20 8 4 5
Divorced/widow(er) 152 79 36 13 11 5

















Primary 256 131 70 25 19 13
Without GCE 396 212 136 42 42 30
With GCE 313 144 49 17 10 10
Higher 97 38 14 9 3 1
Labor market position
Full time job 633 313 148 52 42 32
Part time job 35 19 12 4 4 3
Entrepreneur (no empl.) 68 45 31 11 4 7
Entrepreneur (w. empl.) 23 12 11 3 2 3
Pensioner working 19 8 6 0 2 0
Pensioner not working 120 40 10 4 4 1
Unemployed 59 35 28 7 12 7
Student 65 27 16 9 3 2








Active engagement in informal activities
Total N 
Informal Salary [CZK]21
Table 2. Values and 95%-confidence intervals for relative frequencies of different level of tax
evasion. Czech Republic 1995, 1999 and 2000.
Year Often Sometimes Never
3,2% 12,6% 84,2%
1995
(2,0%, 4,4%) (10,5%, 14,7%) (81,9%, 86,5%)
3,7% 16,7% 79,7%
1999
(2,4%, 4,9%) (14,3%, 19,0%) (77,1%, 82,2%)
3,9% 21,3% 74,9%
2000
(2,6%, 5,1%) (18,7%, 23,9%) (72,1%, 77,6%)

















Table 3. Tax evasion in 1999 versus 2000 in the Czech Republic
Tax evasion in 2000
1999/2000
Often Sometimes Never Total
34 5 0 39
87.2% 12.8% 0.0% 100.0% Often
3.2% 0.5% 0.0% 3.7%
7 170 0 177
4.0% 96.0% 0.0% 100.0% Sometimes
0.7% 16.0% 0.0% 16.7%
0 51 795 846
0.0% 6.0% 94.0% 100.0% Never

























Source: Authors computation. Data on individuals is weighted to achieve representativity.23
Table 4. Transition matrices used in different scenarios of modelling tax evasion dynamics.




Often 3,20% 0,47% 0,00%
Sometimes 0,66% 16,01% 0,00%
T
Never 0,00% 4,80% 74,86%




Often 2,03% 0,46% 0,09%
Sometimes 0,07% 19,64% 0,09%
T
Never 0,09% 3,40% 74,13%
  A
  B24




2000 3,86% 21,28% 74,86%
2001 4,21% 25,45% 70,35%
2002 4,67% 29,22% 66,11%




2000 2,58% 19,80% 77,62%
2001 2,19% 23,50% 74,32%
2002 1,89% 26,95% 71,17%
2003 1,66% 30,18% 68,16%
  B
  A25
Table 6.  Logit regression results for Pn,s (transition from never to sometimes tax evasion
stage). Czech Republic, 1999/2000 (standard errors are in parentheses).
Variable Coefficient
Derivative dP/dX going from






Gap between current and desirable




Family economic situation is worse



















































LR test of zero slopes = 36.32***
N = 582
significant on 10% level, ** significant on 5% level, *** significant on 1% level27
Figure 2.  Dynamics of flows between evading and not evading tax categories
                                                                   Pn,s
                                                               Not evading
      New labor force
Occasional tax evaders
   Ps,o                     Po,s
Frequent tax evaders28
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